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Abstract
We call affective brainocentrism the tendency to privilege the brain over other parts 
of the organism when defining or explaining emotions. We distinguish two versions 
of this tendency. According to brain-sufficient, emotional states are entirely realized 
by brain processes. According to brain-master, emotional states are realized by both 
brain and bodily processes, but the latter are entirely driven by the brain: the brain is 
the master regulator of bodily processes. We argue that both these claims are prob-
lematic, and we draw on physiological accounts of stress to make our main case. 
These accounts illustrate the existence of complex interactions between the brain 
and endocrine systems, the immune system, the enteric nervous system, and even 
gut microbiota. We argue that, because of these complex brain–body interactions, 
the brain cannot be isolated and identified as the basis of stress. We also mention 
recent evidence suggesting that complex brain–body interactions characterize the 
physiology of depression and anxiety. Finally, we call for an alternative dynamical, 
systemic, and embodied approach to the study of the physiology of emotions that 
does not privilege the brain, but rather aims at understanding how mutually regulat-
ing brain and bodily processes jointly realize a variety of emotional states.
Keywords Emotions · Affective science · Brainocentrism · Stress · HPA axis · Gut 
microbiota
Introduction
A long-debated question in affective science and emotion theory concerns the relation-
ship between emotions and bodily changes or processes (in this field, “bodily changes” 
and “bodily processes” are used interchangeably to refer to physiological processes 
that occur specifically outside the brain). There are many theories and definitions of 
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emotions, and they vary in how they conceive of the role of bodily changes. Accord-
ing to some theories, emotions are essentially cognitive states, while bodily changes 
are mere contingent concomitants. According to others, bodily changes are necessary 
constituents of emotions. Yet other theories regard emotions as necessarily involving 
both cognitive and bodily elements (see Scarantino and de Sousa 2018 for an overview 
of different theories and definitions of emotions in philosophy and affective science). 
Arguably, the prevailing approach in affective science today is the so-called “pattern” 
or “componential” view, according to which emotions are constituted by various com-
ponents that co-vary with one another. These components typically include cognitive 
appraisals, facial expressions, action tendencies, autonomic or physiological arousal, 
and sometimes also feelings (Newen et al. 2015; Scherer 2009).
Despite this trend toward regarding bodily changes as important components of 
emotions, it is often claimed that the brain is the basis or substrate of emotions; or, 
equivalently, that emotions are based in the brain (e.g., LeDoux 1996, p. 8; David-
son et al. 2003; Lindquist et al. 2012; Pessoa 2017). What exactly this means is gen-
erally left unexplained. It is clear, however, that this claim goes together with the 
tendency to privilege the brain over other physiological processes when defining or 
explaining emotions. We call this tendency affective brainocentrism and we distin-
guish two versions of it more precisely in the next section. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, 
this tendency is often found in affective neuroscience; yet it also surfaces in philoso-
phy, psychology, and even physiology.
We think that affective brainocentrism is problematic and our goal in this paper is 
to explain why. Our main claim is that interactions between brain and body (under-
stood broadly to encompass commensal microorganisms) are too complex to war-
rant isolating and identifying brain processes as the basis of emotional states. Relat-
edly, bodily processes are not mere contingent accompaniments, or outputs, of such 
states. They are proper realizers of emotional states, together with brain processes. 
In other words, emotional states are physically realized by mutually regulating brain 
and bodily processes.
We support this view mainly by drawing on physiological accounts of stress. Dif-
ferent authors sometimes use the term “stress” to refer to quite different things. We 
use it to refer to an emotional state or condition that individuals can be in, and we 
take physiological accounts of stress to illustrate the physical processes that realize 
this emotional condition. These processes are quite well understood by now, espe-
cially compared to those of other emotional states. Importantly for our discussion, they 
involve complex reciprocal influences among brain and bodily systems—endocrine 
systems in particular, but also the immune system, the enteric nervous system, and 
even the gut microbiota. The physiology of stress thus presents a powerful case against 
affective brainocentrism. We also mention recent evidence suggesting that recipro-
cal brain–body influences characterize the physiology of other emotional conditions 
too, such as depression and anxiety. Although these influences are still only partially 
understood, the available evidence challenges the view that those emotional condi-
tions are based in the brain. In the last section, we conclude by explicitly calling for 
a dynamical, systemic, and embodied approach to the study of the physical realizers 
of emotional states. We argue that this approach needs to be adopted not only in the 
case of stress, depression, and anxiety, but other emotional states too. We also briefly 
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reflect on why it may be that recognition of the complex interconnectedness of brain 
and bodily processes, widespread in biology, still co-exists with brainocentric claims.
Two versions of affective brainocentrism
Affective brainocentrism is most apparent in the claim that emotions are brain states. 
According to a recent working definition by two neuroscientists, “emotions are 
internal brain states that cause observable external changes in behaviour; observ-
able internal physiological changes in the state of the body; changes in other men-
tal states; and, under some conditions and in some species, changes in what we are 
consciously aware of” (Adolphs and Anderson 2018, p. 30; italics in original). In the 
course of the book they reiterate that emotions are “central states”, which they take 
to be synonymous with “internal brain states”. Their approach is a good illustration 
of what we call brain-sufficient: the brainocentric claim that the brain is sufficient 
for affective states. Philosophers have made this claim too. Thagard, for example, 
writes: “[b]asic emotions like happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise 
can all be understood as brain processes, as can more complex social emotions such 
as shame, guilt, contempt, envy, pride, and gratitude” (2010, p. 94). The view that 
the brain entirely realizes an individual’s mental states is widespread among phil-
osophical materialistic accounts of the mind. Wilson (2001) calls it “the standard 
view of realization”. According to it, “physical states of individuals—more particu-
larly, of the central nervous system of individuals—are the physical realizations of 
an individual’s mental states, and these realizers are metaphysically sufficient for 
the presence of the states they realize” (Wilson 2001, p. 2). In the case of emo-
tional states, this standard view is also manifest in influential works (both academic 
and popular-scientific) that call the brain “emotional”, “affective”, “happy”, and so 
on (see Table  1).1 In line with brain-sufficient, qualifying the brain as emotional, 
Table 1  A selection of literature representing the brainocentric perspective (brain-sufficient)
Author, date Title (book or article)
Simonov (1986) The Emotional Brain
LeDoux (1996) The Emotional Brain
Dalgleish (2004) The emotional brain
Wehrenberg and Prinz (2007) The Anxious Brain
Davidson and Begley (2012) The Emotional Life of your Brain
Pessoa (2013) The Cognitive–Emotional Brain
Gasque (2016) Seven glimpses into the emotional brain
Pessoa (2017) A network model of the emotional brain
Burnett (2018) The Happy Brain
1 There is even a lab—Tali Sharot’s laboratory at University College London—called “The Affective 
Brain Lab”.
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affective, etc. implies that properties of the brain alone determine the presence of 
emotional states. Methodologically, this view entails that, to explain the properties 
of an individual’s emotional state, one just needs to look at brain activity.
Affective brainocentrism also comes in a subtler form, which we call brain-mas-
ter. This is the view that the brain initiates emotions, and drives or controls their 
unfolding. LeDoux, for example, writes that “emotions come from brains” (1996, p. 
13) and that the brain is the system that “generates” affective responses (1996, p. 18; 
see also LeDoux 2000). Panksepp (1998) repeatedly claims that the brain “gener-
ates”, “creates”, “produces”, as well as “controls” emotional behaviours and feelings 
(see for example the initial section on “Conceptual Background”; see also Panksepp 
2005; Panksepp et al. 2017). Lindquist et al. (2012, p. 121; 172) regard understand-
ing how the brain “creates” emotions as a long-standing and important goal of affec-
tive science. Even Adolphs and Anderson, who, as we saw, define emotions as brain 
states, at times also say that emotions “are produced by the brain” (2018, p. 12). 
This version of brainocentrism is subtler than the previous one because it does not 
identify the physical realizers of emotions with brain processes only. According to 
it, emotions are not just “embrained” but embodied, in the sense that they are physi-
cally realized not just by brain processes but also bodily ones. Nevertheless, this 
account is still brainocentric, as it privileges the brain by characterizing it as the 
generator and controller of (the rest of) emotional states. This account also regards 
bodily changes occurring during emotions as mere products or outputs of brain 
activity.
Importantly, affective brainocentrism is not just the claim that brain processes 
contribute to bringing about emotions. There is ample evidence supporting this 
claim, and we do not take issue with it here. In humans, for example, evidence 
from brain lesions has shown that damage to specific parts of the brain (such as 
the amygdala and the insula) results in impaired emotional behaviour or blunted 
feelings for specific emotions (fear and disgust, respectively) (Damasio et  al. 
2003; Adolphs and Anderson 2018, chapter  8). This evidence, however, sup-
ports at most the claim that those brain areas are necessary for (at least some) 
emotions. It does not support the stronger brainocentric claim that those brain 
areas are also sufficient. Nor does it support the brainocentric claim that those 
areas have a privileged role in causing affective states (i.e., by creating or driv-
ing them) compared to bodily processes—for the simple reason that brain lesion 
studies can only tell us something about the causal contribution of processes 
occurring in the brain. Likewise for those few electrical-stimulation studies in 
humans that found that stimulating certain areas of the brain elicited specific 
emotional feelings or behaviours, such as deep sadness, mirth and laughter, or 
disgust and nausea-related sensations (Adolphs and Anderson 2018, chapter  8, 
pp. 229–230). Another important source of evidence that brain activity plays a 
role in emotional states comes from animal studies that involve the manipulation 
of specific brain areas and the observation of subsequent behavioural changes. 
In particular, much is known today about brain processes involved in fear condi-
tioning, largely thanks to the development of technologies that allow manipulat-
ing individual neurons. For example, there is evidence that activating neurons in 
specific nuclei of the rodent amygdala produces freezing (Adolphs and Anderson 
1 3
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2018, chapter 6). This type of evidence, like the one from stimulation studies in 
humans, contributes to showing that specific neurons causally influence behav-
iours typically associated with certain emotions. Once again, however, it does not 
support (either version of) affective brainocentrism—because, once again, it can-
not rule out a possible role of bodily processes too.
Challenging affective brainocentrism: the case of stress
We now turn to recent physiological accounts of stress to challenge both versions 
of affective brainocentrism. In this section and the next we argue that neither brain-
sufficient nor brain-master can accommodate these accounts.
To clarify, we use “stress” to refer to an emotional state or condition that one can 
be in. This is the condition of “being stressed”, just as one can be in the emotional 
condition of being happy, scared, depressed, anxious, and so on. Some authors use 
“stress” differently, to refer to life-threatening or challenging circumstances that put 
pressure (i.e., stress) on the organism. We prefer to call these “stressors” (as they 
are also often called). Because stress occurs in response to stressors, we also some-
times talk of the “stress response” (just as happiness, fear, etc., are often referred 
to as “emotional responses” to indicate that they are responses to events). Scientific 
accounts also use this term frequently to describe physiological processes occur-
ring during stress.
We take stress to be realized physically (like any other emotion and mental state 
more generally), and the question we are interested in here is what the physical real-
izers of stress are. We thus look at physiological accounts of stress, which describe 
these physical realizers. Physiological accounts are often contrasted with psycho-
logical ones, which aim primarily at identifying the cognitive processes that lead 
individuals to become stressed. Psychological accounts importantly emphasise indi-
vidual differences in how individuals respond to the same circumstances, includ-
ing the fact that some individuals but not others find certain circumstances stressful. 
These accounts, however, have not much to say about the physical processes real-
izing stress.2
Finally, in what follows we are not concerned specifically with feelings. 
Although feelings are part of the folk-psychological understanding of stress, we 
do not regard them as necessary for being stressed (in line with arguments for the 
existence of unconscious or unfelt emotions; e.g., Scarantino 2010). Our concern 
is with the physical realizers that constitute the (not necessarily conscious) condi-
tion of being stressed, and our aim is to emphasize that these realizers are not all 
in the brain.
2 Physiological accounts of stress are traditionally traced to Hans Selye’s notion of the general adapta-
tion syndrome (originally advanced in Selye 1936). Psychological accounts are the legacy of Richard 
Lazarus’s (1966) work on cognitive appraisal and coping processes. For the complex history of the 
notion and science of stress, see Cooper and Dewe (2004) and Jackson (2013).
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The standard physiological account
Consider first what we may call “the standard physiological account of stress”, as 
is typically presented in handbooks and review papers (for a general introduction, 
see Widmaier et al. 2014, chapter 11 section D; for a more detailed description, see 
Everly and Lating 2013). This account divides the stress response into two branches, 
both involving the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis. This is constituted 
by the hypothalamus (located in the brain), the pituitary gland (located outside the 
brain, in a bony hollow behind the bridge of the nose just below the hypothala-
mus), and the adrenal glands (located on top of each kidney). One branch involves 
increased activity of the sympathetic nervous system, leading to increased secretion 
of epinephrine and norepinephrine from sympathetic neuron terminals and from the 
innervated adrenal medulla (the innermost part of the adrenal glands). This branch 
is responsible for the so-called “fight or flight response”, already studied by Cannon 
(1932). In the other branch, stressors stimulate the hypothalamus to release cortico-
tropin-releasing hormone (CRH) and arginine vasopressin (AVP), which reach the 
pituitary through a blood portal system and via axons, respectively. In the pituitary, 
these hormones stimulate the secretion of adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), 
which travels through the bloodstream to the adrenal cortex (which encloses the 
medulla) and stimulates the synthesis and secretion of glucocorticoids (e.g., cortisol 
in humans). Alongside epinephrine and norepinephrine, glucocorticoids are often 
called “stress hormones”.
Glucocorticoids are rapidly secreted (Spiga et  al. 2017) to prepare the body to 
deal with stressors (for example, they trigger anti-inflammatory and immunosup-
pressive effects, and affect glucose expenditure). In addition, and importantly for our 
argument, they also regulate their own synthesis by inhibiting the secretory activity 
of the pituitary and hypothalamus, which downregulates further release of ACTH 
and, consequently, reduces glucocorticoid synthesis (Fig. 1). In healthy organisms, 
this is the homeostatic (or rather homeodynamic) negative feedback process that 
prevents prolonged exposure to high levels of circulating glucocorticoids.
Fig. 1  Dynamic regulation 
within the HPA axis. Posi-
tive (negative) interactions are 
indicated by arrows (edges). 
Once secreted, glucocorticoids 
inhibit their own synthesis via 
negative feedback loops with the 
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Implications for brain‑sufficient
Before considering further physiological details, note that the account described so 
far is already evidently at odds with brain-sufficient. It characterizes stress as real-
ized not by brain activity only, but by neuroendocrine processes that span brain and 
body. Relatedly, the standard physiological account already entails that looking at 
the brain only cannot provide an adequate explanation of how organisms respond to 
stressors.
A corollary of this point is that the standard physiological account is also at 
odds with the view that bodily changes are mere outputs of stress. This view can 
be found for example in Panksepp (1998, p. 119). He acknowledges that various 
bodily responses (immune, visceral, enteric) “are recruited during stress”, and that 
they influence the brain through nervous and humoral paths. Nevertheless, he still 
characterizes stress as “centrally integrated” in limbic areas of the brain, and bodily 
processes as the “output” of activity in these areas. He explicitly claims that the task 
of describing the brain circuitry of stress has priority over the one of describing bod-
ily effects (“the more basic and crucial task is to explore the central brain systems 
that mediate emotionality”). Yet all he says in support of this privileging of the brain 
is that “the brain itself contains many similar neural systems” to those of the periph-
eral nervous system—seemingly implying that studying these neural systems in the 
brain is sufficient for studying stress. Clearly, however, this similarity entails neither 
that stress is “centrally integrated” in the brain nor that looking at brain processes 
“is the more basic and crucial task”. Moreover, as we saw, the physiology of stress 
involves not just neural processes but also endocrine ones that are not “contained” in 
the brain, and that an exclusive focus on brain activity is bound to miss.
The standard physiological account fits naturally with an embodied view of the 
condition of being stressed, according to which both brain and bodily processes are 
physical realizers. Consider an analogy with digestion. Handbook physiological 
accounts of the digestive process characterize it as starting already in the mouth, 
where enzymes contained in the saliva begin to break food down. Food then reaches 
the stomach, which secretes various gastric juices. Simultaneously, other organs 
(e.g., liver, pancreas, gallbladder) secrete enzymes that facilitate the breakdown of 
complex molecules into glucose and regulate glucose homeostasis (Widmaier et al. 
2014, chapter 15). Given this account, to claim that the digestive process is entirely 
realized by processes taking place in the stomach would be unwarrantedly narrow 
and misleading, because it would leave out organs and activities that are regarded 
as constitutive parts of the physiology of digestion. The common understanding of 
the physiology of digestion is that it includes not just processes occurring in the 
stomach but also in the mouth, liver, pancreas, gallbladder, as well as in organs of 
the gastrointestinal tract that contribute further to breaking food down into nutrients 
(ileum, duodenum, small bowel, and colon). We claim an analogous case for stress. 
The common understanding of stress, given what is known about its physiology, is 
that it is realized by processes occurring in both brain and body. To regard stress as 
taking place in the brain only would be unwarrantedly narrow and misleading, given 
what we know about the influence of bodily processes on the organism’s response to 
stressors and on brain activity itself.
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One might remark, at this point, that it is not clear that activation of the HPA axis 
is relevant for criticizing brainocentrism, because historically this axis initially com-
prised only the pituitary and the adrenal glands, while the hypothalamus was added 
later on. Indeed, Selye’s (1936) first description of the general adaptation syndrome 
only mentioned changes in the body. Only later did he mention the hypothalamus as 
a possible initiator of the syndrome (Selye 1950); and, even then, he still described 
the syndrome entirely in terms of bodily changes, focusing on endocrine processes. 
This historical consideration, however, does not undermine our argument. Arguably 
it reinforces it, as it may be used to emphasize that bodily processes have long been 
regarded as parts of the physical realization of stress. It is certainly an interesting 
question why, from an initial focus on the body, accounts of this physical realiza-
tion have shifted toward a more brain-based perspective—such as Panksepp’s (1998) 
view mentioned above, but also, as we are about to see, in recent physiological 
accounts.3
Implications for brain‑master, and further physiological details
Having argued that it is implausible to maintain brain-sufficient in the case of stress, 
we now turn to brain-master. Is it plausible to regard the brain as the master regula-
tor that initiates, and drives or controls, the organism’s response to stressors? Brain-
master is arguably the prevailing view in contemporary physiological accounts of 
stress. These often describe the brain as containing structures that evaluate the sig-
nificance of a situation as threatening, and structures that initiate and control a series 
of responses in the body that allow the organism to cope with the situation (e.g., 
McEwen 2006, 2007; Everly and Lating 2013). This view is similar to cognitive-
componential approaches to emotion, according to which cognitive components of 
emotions elicit and drive the bodily components (e.g., Scherer 2009). McEwen, for 
example, explicitly claims that the brain “is the key organ of stress” (2006, p. 367) 
and “the master regulator of the neuroendocrine, autonomic, and immune systems” 
(2006, p. 371).
Interestingly, brain-master is often endorsed along with the acknowledgment of 
the existence of bidirectional influences between brain and body. The same scientists 
who regard the brain as initiating and driving the physiological stress response also 
talk of the “systemic circulation” (Everly and Lating 2013, p. 43) or the “nonlin-
earity” (McEwen 2006, p. 370, 2007, p. 881) that characterizes brain–body inter-
actions during this response. This acknowledgement, however, is in tension with 
brain-master, because it entails not only that the brain influences the stress response 
as it unfolds, but also that the brain’s influence on this response is itself regulated 
by bodily processes. Importantly, the stress response involves not only short-term 
3 Answering this question would be a complex historical task, partly because of the existence of several 
different influences on current physiological accounts of stress. As a recent brief historical account shows 
(Miller 2018), since the 1920s empirical findings at different times led to different claims about possible 
loci of control of the HPA axis. Moreover, social and ideological factors arguably often trump empirical 
evidence when it comes to brainocentric claims (see last section).
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bodily influences on the brain, but also long-term ones. In chronic stress (induced by 
prolonged and repeated exposure to stressors), stress hormones have been found to 
induce structural changes in the hippocampus, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex, with 
related alterations in cognitive and behavioural functions (McEwen 2007). It is dif-
ficult, we maintain, to uphold brain-master in the face of this evidence.
One might retort that it is possible to admit the existence of influences from the 
body to the brain, while also maintaining that the brain is still what drives the physi-
ological and behavioral responses characteristic of being stressed. A tacit wide-
spread assumption here appears to be that physiological processes are organized 
hierarchically, with the brain sending out instructions to the body and then modify-
ing them in light of incoming signals from it. Indeed, the brain is often said to “con-
trol” bodily processes, whereas the latter are said merely to “modulate” the brain 
(e.g., Davidson et al. 2003, p. 4, write that “while the central nervous system obvi-
ously represents and controls the autonomic nervous system, there is also important 
feedback from the ANS to the central nervous system, that serves to modulate cen-
tral function”; see also McEwen 2006, 2007). “Modulation” refers to a modification 
of an ongoing process that has been triggered by something else. There is, in other 
words, an asymmetry in the characterization of the causal powers of brain and body. 
The brain is taken to “hold the reins” of stress by driving its unfolding; the body is 
granted causal power, but only a “modulatory” one (rather than a fully “controlling” 
one), revealing the assumption that its influence is somehow less important than that 
of the brain. Note, though, that this asymmetry is typically just stated rather than 
justified on the basis of evidence and arguments. If we keep to the available evi-
dence, all it shows is that there are reciprocal influences involved in the physiology 
of stress, such that without certain brain processes some bodily processes do not 
occur—and, importantly, vice versa.4
Moreover, there is additional evidence about the physiology of the HPA axis that 
further undermines brain-master. It has been known since the 1950s that plasma 
concentrations of glucocorticoids fluctuate with a 24-h periodicity (circadian vari-
ation), with maximum values observed just before awakening (for an overview, see 
Kalsbeek et  al. 2012). More recently, it has become clear that the concentrations 
of these hormones increase and decrease also with a near-hourly rhythm (ultradian 
oscillations) (Russell et al. 2015). The combination of these fluctuations gives rise to 
the pattern represented in Fig. 2.
The significance of this oscillatory pattern is the subject of much research, and 
there is evidence showing that its chronic disruption is associated with both physi-
ological and behavioural disorders (Lightman and Conway-Campbell 2010; Rus-
sell et al. 2015; Spiga et al. 2015). Importantly, whereas the hypothalamus had been 
hypothesised to be the source of ultradian oscillations by acting as a pulse genera-
tor (Mershon et al. 1992), later theoretical models predicted that feedback interac-
tions between the pituitary and adrenal glands would suffice to generate ultradian 
4 A similar situation prevails for genes, and whether they encode or control phenotypic development (see 
Oyama 2000). The privileged status accorded to genes in some explanations is very similar to the status 
accorded to brains in some explanations of emotional states.
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pulsatility (Walker et  al. 2010). Subsequent animal studies have confirmed this 
model by showing that these oscillations persist even when pulsatile signals from 
the brain are blocked (Waite et  al. 2012). In other words, the ultradian rhythm is 
generated and regulated by pituitary–adrenal interactions, independent of the 
hypothalamus.
Particularly significant for our argument is the finding that the magnitude of the 
organism’s response to a stressor depends on whether the stressor occurs during 
either the rising or falling phase of the ultradian glucocorticoid oscillation. Studies 
in rats conducted in the late 1990s already showed that the magnitude of the organ-
ism’s response to an acute noise stressor applied during the rising phase is enhanced, 
relative to the magnitude of the response to the same stressor applied during the fall-
ing phase (Windle et al. 1998a, b, 2001; see also Rankin et al. 2012). Later studies 
in male rats indicated the existence of a correlation between ultradian glucocorti-
coid rhythms and the propensity to behave aggressively (Haller et al. 2000, 2001). In 
these studies, not only the circulating levels of glucocorticoids affected the patterns 
of aggression toward an intruder (social stressor), but rats were significantly more 
aggressive when confronting the intruder in the rising phase of their ultradian gluco-
corticoid fluctuation, compared to counterparts in the decreasing phase.5
These findings further undermine brain-master, in that they demonstrate that 
the organism’s response to stressors is at least partly controlled by oscillating bod-







Fig. 2  Schematics of circadian (24 h) and ultradian ( ~ 1 h) oscillations in plasma concentrations of glu-
cocorticoids
5 In humans, low glucocorticoid levels are associated with a propensity to aggression, disruptive behav-
iour and antisocial personality (Virkkunen 1985; Vanyukov et al. 1993; McBurnett et al. 2000), but the 
causal links between these and glucocorticoid dynamics are yet to be determined. A recent study in 
humans has shown that administering the same dose of cortisol in different dynamic patterns influences 
the brain’s responsiveness to emotional stimulation, accuracy in recognition, and attention bias toward/
away from emotional faces (Kalafatakis et al. 2018).
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importantly, that this oscillation is independent of the brain. They also further 
undermine brain-sufficient, because they provide additional evidence that factors 
outside the brain (and not under its influence) are indispensable for explaining the 
occurrence and unfolding of the stress response, and moreover for explaining how 
the brain reacts during stress. In the face of this evidence, upholding brain-sufficient 
for the case of stress is still a possible metaphysical option, but one increasingly at 
odds with current scientific explanatory practices and findings. We think that the lat-
ter ought to have a say in establishing what processes count as physical realizers of 
emotional states—including displacing the view that stress is a brain process, when 
it is evident that mutual influences between brain and body make both explanatorily 
indispensable.
In sum, physiological evidence from neuroendocrinology undermines the view 
that stress is based in the brain, in both the brain-sufficient and brain-master sense. 
There is thus at least one emotional state that is not brain-based. In the next section, 
we challenge affective brainocentrism further. First, we argue that the physiological 
realizers of stress can be seen as extending even beyond the neuroendocrine pro-
cesses described in this section. Second, we present some evidence suggesting that 
other emotional states, such as depression and anxiety, are not brain-centred either.
The role of other physiological systems in stress and other emotional 
conditions
It would not be accurate to conclude that the physiological realizers of stress are 
limited to the neuroendocrine processes described in the previous section. Scien-
tific research in the last 15 years has begun to show just how more complex the 
physiology of stress is, and how difficult it is to draw fixed uncontroversial bound-
aries around its physical realizers. This research challenges brainocentrism fur-
ther. It has now become clear that the processes described so far are deeply inter-
related with the gastrointestinal tract (Konturek et al. 2011). Stressful situations 
influence gut physiology at many levels, e.g., alter gastrointestinal motility and 
secretion, increase intestinal permeability, and modify intestinal microbiota (the 
many different bacteria and other microorganisms that live in the gut). They also 
induce the release of various neurotransmitters (from both the central and enteric 
nervous system) and proinflammatory cytokines (from the immune system), 
both of which influence gut physiology. Vice versa, a growing body of evidence 
shows that the condition of the gut affects the organism’s response to stressors. 
Gut–brain connections began to be investigated already in the first half of the 
twentieth century, although current researchers usually cite Sudo et al. (2004) as 
the starting point of contemporary work on the so-called “microbiota–gut–brain 
axis” (see Hooks et  al. 2019). Sudo et  al. showed that germ-free mice (mice 
raised in the absence of microorganisms) displayed disproportionally elevated 
levels of glucocorticoids in stressful situations, and that recolonizing the mice 
with individual strains of microbes selectively influenced the activity of the HPA 
axis. Since then, several other studies have looked at the relation between stress 
and the microbiota–gut–brain axis in rodents. Overall, they support the view that 
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gut microbiota are influenced by, and influence, the stress response (Sarkar et al. 
2018)—even though not much is known about the specific causal pathways and 
mechanisms of these interconnections (Hooks et al. 2019). In humans, the effects 
of bacteria on stress have been studied mainly by looking at the effects of probiot-
ics—defined as living microorganisms that, when ingested, contribute to bringing 
about some health effect (possibly by altering the gut microbiota). Some studies 
have found that consuming probiotics (compared to a placebo) reduces cortisol or 
prevents its increase in stressful circumstances, among other effects (e.g., Mes-
saoudi et al. 2011; Kato-Kataoka et al. 2016).
In addition, interactions between brain, gastrointestinal tract, and gut microbiota 
appear to be mediated by other bodily systems—such as the enteric nervous system 
and the immune system (Rhee et al. 2009; Konturek et al. 2011; Lyte et al. 2011). If 
it is the case that exposure to stressors affects all these systems and their relations, 
and vice versa, restricting the physiology of stress to neuroendocrine processes 
on the HPA axis is arguably too narrow. In fact, the very enterprise of looking for 
the physical realizers of stress as if these had clear, fixed boundaries, is starting to 
appear incomplete at best, and misguided at worst. It may well be wisest, then, to 
give up trying to identify a fixed “basis” of stress altogether.
These considerations can be extended to argue that the brain is not the basis of 
other emotional conditions either, such as depression and anxiety. There is evidence 
of reciprocal links between chronically elevated glucocorticoids, the brain, and the 
immune system in depression (see Maier and Watkins 1998; Dantzer et  al. 2008; 
Slavich and Irwin 2014). During inflammation, the immune system produces pro-
inflammatory cytokines that influence the brain, and the brain in turn sends sig-
nals to inhibit the inflammatory process. Interestingly, pro-inflammatory cytokines 
appear to have at least some effects on depressive symptoms (such as low mood, 
anhedonia, fatigue, and socio-behavioural withdrawal), and a few studies have 
shown that anti-inflammatory agents alleviate these symptoms (reviewed in Slav-
ich and Irwin 2014). Claims have been made that gut bacteria, too, may have an 
influence on depression and anxiety in humans, as well as on depression-like and 
anxiety-like behaviour in rodents (reviewed in Cryan and Dinan 2012; Foster and 
Neufeld 2013; Sarkar et  al. 2018). For example, faecal transplants from mice dis-
playing high anxiety-like behaviour to “non-anxious” mice produce an anxious-like 
phenotype (i.e., mice displaying reduced exploratory behaviour), and vice versa 
for transplants from mice displaying low anxiety-like behaviour to “anxious” mice 
(reviewed in Sarkar et al. 2018). Administration of a specific strand of bacteria in 
mice has been shown to alter anxiety-like and depression-like symptoms via influ-
ences on GABA receptor expression (Bravo et al. 2011). Tryptophan-metabolizing 
gut microbiota contribute to changes in the amount of serotonin in the gastrointes-
tinal epithelium (where most of the body’s serotonin is produced), and serotonin is 
known to be one of the key neurotransmitters altered in depression (Jenkins et al. 
2016). Recent reviews acknowledge a possible role for probiotics in alleviating 
depressive symptoms in humans, although they also emphasize the need for further 
research and double-blind randomized control trials (Wallace and Milev 2017; Ng 
et al. 2018; Park et al. 2018).
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Importantly, this research has not gone unchallenged. A recent critical analysis 
(Hooks et al. 2019) highlights various methodological and conceptual shortcomings, 
including the tendency to draw simplistic conclusions and make bold claims about 
how the gut microbiota, or specific bacterial strands, influence (even “control” or 
“manipulate”) brain, behaviour, and mental states (see also Taylor 2019 for similar 
concerns about microbiota–gut–brain research applied to mental health; for broader 
criticisms of causal claims about microbiota, see Hanage 2014). Nevertheless, 
it is well established by now that there are various forms of reciprocal influences 
between brain and body (including gut microbiota). Additionally, there is increasing 
evidence that complexly interrelated processes straddling brain and body influence, 
and are influenced by, emotional conditions such as stress, depression, and anxiety. 
Even though the causal pathways linking specific physiological changes to aspects 
of affective behaviour and experience remain poorly understood, the implication is 
that focusing solely on the brain can provide only a very limited account of the phys-
ical realization of those conditions.
Concluding remarks
In sum, we have argued that affective brainocentrism is problematic by showing that 
it is not compatible with current physiological accounts of at least some emotional 
states or conditions. Evidence from physiology shows that when an individual is 
stressed, depressed, or anxious, these conditions are sustained through complex 
interactions between brain and bodily processes. This complex interactivity under-
mines both the claim that the brain is the sole realizer of those conditions, and that 
it is their locus of control or master regulator. It also undermines the methodological 
assumption that studying the brain only can provide adequate and complete explana-
tions of those emotional conditions (as in Panksepp’s claim that “the more basic and 
crucial task is to explore the central brain systems that mediate emotionality”).
What then follows from our argument? In this concluding section we highlight 
a number of varied points. First, in our view affective brainocentrism needs to be 
abandoned. Research into the physiology of emotional states should proceed by rec-
ognising from the start the deep integration of brain processes with the rest of the 
organism (including commensal microorganisms). Proper recognition of this biolog-
ical fact should lead to taking the body more seriously than is often the case in affec-
tive science, where bodily changes are usually assumed to be secondary or ancillary 
to the brain (either as mere side-effects of brain-based emotions; or, at most, as mod-
ulators of brain-driven emotions). It should lead instead to regarding brain and body 
as jointly contributing, through mutually regulatory processes, to the occurrence and 
temporal unfolding of emotional states.
This proposal amounts, in effect, to an invitation to adopt a dynamical, systemic, 
and embodied approach to the study of the physiology of emotional states. Tak-
ing such an approach means looking at how physiological processes in both brain 
and body unfold and change over time, and influence one another; and at how their 
mutual influences over time make a difference to the individual’s emotional con-
dition. The study of the physiology of stress illustrates this approach particularly 
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well. In our opinion, it provides the most detailed account available of brain–body 
influences at different timescales in the case of an emotional condition. Accounts 
of the physiology of depression and anxiety that emphasize the influence of bod-
ily processes, such as the immune system and the gut microbiota, are also relevant, 
although comparatively less detailed. Tracing the specific contributions of various 
brain and bodily processes to those conditions is a complex task, and it may take 
a long time to achieve the same level of detail and understanding as in the case of 
stress. Nevertheless, we think those accounts are important—not least because they 
challenge and counterbalance the tendency, in psychiatry, to reduce mental disor-
ders to brain disorders (for an illustration of this tendency see Vidal and Ortega 
2017, chapter  3). At the same time, adopting a dynamical, systemic, and embod-
ied approach to those conditions also involves refraining from shifting most or even 
all regulatory burden from brain processes to bodily ones. As we have seen, claims 
have been made that the gut microbiota drive, govern, or manipulate us (Hooks et al. 
2019). These claims are just as misleading as saying that the brain controls us. In a 
systemic framework, control is rather best understood as a function of the whole sys-
tem achieved through the mutually regulatory influences of its constituent processes.
Second, what about the many other emotional states studied in affective science, 
such as fear, anger, happiness, disgust, guilt, shame, and so on? Do our considera-
tions in this paper apply to them as well? Or is it more plausible to regard them as 
based in the brain—in the sense of either brain-sufficient, or at least brain-master? 
One might claim that all we have shown is that a few moods and mood disorders 
are not based in the brain; and that we have not provided any argument against the 
view that (most) emotions are based in the brain. This objection would appeal to the 
widespread distinction between emotions and moods. How exactly to draw this dis-
tinction is controversial, but some criteria are relatively well agreed-upon (see Ste-
phan 2017). Many philosophers in particular regard emotions as intentional, namely, 
as directed at specific objects or states of affairs (one is angry with someone, afraid 
of something, happy about a certain situation). On the other hand, they regard 
moods as objectless, i.e., as not directed at anything. When one is in a bad mood, 
the bad mood is not about anything; similarly when one is grumpy, elated, or ener-
gized. According to this criterion, stress, depression, and anxiety are moods rather 
than emotions, as they are arguably not directed at anything. Another criterion, more 
common in psychology, is that emotions are short-lived while moods are longer-
lasting. Emotions are taken to last from a few seconds to a few minutes. Moods, on 
the other hand, are taken to last from several minutes to hours, days, or even longer 
(clinical mood disorders, for example, can endure for months to years).
In response, note first that not all affective scientists draw this distinction clearly 
or absolutely. Eliciting emotions in the laboratory is sometimes called “mood induc-
tion” and is achieved through methods (e.g., music, autobiographical memories) that 
arguably elicit generalized objectless moods, rather than emotions (see discussion in 
Fox 2008, chapter 2). Relatedly, many affective scientists, including neuroscientists, 
use the term “emotions” to refer to both shorter and longer states. When they say 
that the brain generates or controls “emotions”, often they mean both brief emo-
tional episodes and longer-lasting conditions such as (what some call) moods. Sec-
ond, importantly long-lasting states such as those we have discussed here influence 
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shorter-lived emotional episodes (Stephan 2017). We know from everyday experi-
ence and clinical research that being stressed can make one more aggressive and 
likely to become angry. Anxiety typically comes with frequent episodes of fear and 
worry, and depression with guilt and hopelessness. A possible explanation of these 
influences is that moods and mood disorders, as realized by integrated brain–body 
processes, set up a physiological landscape that alters the arousal threshold for 
specific emotions. As Ekman (1994, p. 57) puts it, moods “lower the threshold for 
arousing the emotions, which occur most frequently during a particular mood. … 
In an irritable mood people construe the world around them in a way that permits, 
if not calls for, an angry response”. If this is correct, to regard moods as realized 
by integrated brain–body processes, and emotions as based in the brain, is to adopt 
a narrow and therefore arguably misleading perspective—one that does not suffi-
ciently acknowledge the contribution that longer-lasting brain and bodily processes 
jointly make to the occurrence of short-lived episodes.
More generally, we do not think that the domain of emotional states can be strictly 
divided into those that are brain-based and those that are not. The brain, after all, is 
always deeply interconnected with the rest of the organism—not just when one is 
stressed, anxious, or depressed. We have mentioned evidence of specific brain–body 
interactions occurring during these conditions, but we do not want to suggest that 
brain and body are otherwise decoupled. brain–body integration is the norm, not the 
exception. Accordingly, it seems implausible to reject brainocentrism for some emo-
tional states but not for others.
Third, one might wonder why brainocentrism persists in affective science, given 
that the integration of brain and body is old news in biology and neuroscientists are 
also well aware of it. It is indeed interesting that some researchers, as we have seen, 
make brainocentric claims even when they explicitly note that brain and body are 
complexly interrelated. Awareness of the deep interconnectedness of brain and body 
has not led to abandoning the assumption that the brain can somehow be unplugged 
from the rest of the organism and take on the role of sole realizer, or master regula-
tor, of emotional states.
Why this happens, we suspect, has no straightforward explanation. One reason 
might be that, historically, affective science has had stronger methodological and theo-
retical links with cognitive science than with biology and physiology. That cognitive 
states are realized by brain processes is arguably the default position in mainstream 
cognitive science. This default position may just have been transferred to emotional 
states too. So strong is the grip of the default position, that the deep integration of 
brain and body, even though widely recognized, is not enough to dispel it. But why 
is brainocentrism so resilient? This is, we think, a complex socio-historical question. 
As Vidal and Ortega (2017) have recently argued, what they call “the ideology of the 
cerebral subject” is a deeply entrenched assumption in Western culture since at least the 
eighteenth century. By this phrase they refer to the assumption that “we are essentially 
our brains” (2017, p. 5). They define this assumption as an “ideology” because, they 
argue, it is not supported by empirical evidence. We think they have a point here—even 
though unfortunately they do not discuss the positive contribution that cognitive and 
affective neuroscience have made to the understanding of the causal roles of various 
brain processes to our mental life. As we noted before, empirical evidence does not 
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support affective brainocentrism. Neither brain-lesion and brain-stimulation studies in 
humans, nor brain-manipulation studies in animals, can establish that the brain is the 
sole realizer or the master regulator of emotional states. This is because they do not 
provide evidence ruling out the possible role of other physiological processes. Absent 
this evidence, claims that emotions are based in the brain remain unwarranted and thus 
open to the charge of being ideological.
Finally, what about physical processes that occur in the environment outside the 
organism, including non-biological ones? Should we regard them as physical realiz-
ers of emotional conditions too, at least in some cases? The systemic perspective we 
favour implies a positive answer to this question. If certain environmental processes are 
closely integrated with physiological processes, such that this integration contributes to 
maintaining a certain emotional condition, we see no principled reasons why the envi-
ronmental processes in question should not also be considered part of the physical real-
ization of that emotional condition. Some philosophers have in fact already made this 
point as part of recent debates on the so-called “extended mind thesis” (e.g., Stephan 
et al. 2014; Krueger 2014; Colombetti 2017). Emotional states are said to “extend” into 
the environment when their physical realization is not limited to brain and bodily pro-
cesses, but includes parts of the environment (from hormonal patches to musical instru-
ments) closely coupled to the organism.
Although we sympathize with this view, in this paper we have chosen to focus spe-
cifically on biological integration at the organism level (including microbiota) to high-
light physiological findings that we think should be given more attention in affective 
science, as well as philosophy. Surprisingly, perhaps, philosophical arguments that 
emphasize the embodied nature of the mind hardly make any reference to the inter-
relation of the brain with the peripheral nervous system, the endocrine system, the gut 
microbiota, etc. (see for example papers in Shapiro 2014; Newen et al. 2018). This lit-
erature overlooks these biological details, possibly as a consequence of functionalism 
in philosophy of mind, which generally disregards how mental functions are materially 
implemented. We hope to have shown that, on the contrary, biological details do mat-
ter for deciding how to conceptualize the relation between emotional states and their 
physical realizers—and, ultimately, for dispelling assumptions about the ontological 
and causal primacy of the brain that are deeply entrenched in philosophy, cognitive and 
affective science, and well beyond.
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